The British Expeditionary Force, 1939-40 by Edward Smalley

Author:Edward Smalley [Smalley, Edward]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
ISBN: 9781137494214
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Published: 2015-05-25T16:00:00+00:00

6

Discipline

From GHQ to the lowliest NCO, the chain of command consciously under-recorded levels of ill-discipline within the BEF. Despite this a significant number of the BEF’s professional regulars and dedicated pre-war Territorials were involved in ill-discipline. Generally, rear-echelon units experienced the worst disciplinary levels and Territorial infantry battalions the best, although there were exceptions in both cases. Levels of ill-discipline depended on length of deployment, amount of officer supervision and proximity to temptation. The bureaucratic paperwork, the damage to a unit’s reputation, awareness of limited detention capacity and the potential loss of precious manpower actively encouraged commanders to turn a blind eye to all but the most serious breaches of discipline. Instead, internal solutions, such as unofficial punishment and transfers to alternative positions were used to indicate the displeasure of the disciplinary system. The Army failed to deal with endemic inappropriate alcohol consumption and proved incapable of dealing with widespread black marketeering, leading to drunkenness and theft being two of the offences most under-reported in the BEF. Failure to clamp down on these relatively trivial offences led individuals to commit further, more serious crimes against colleagues, superiors and civilians. Combat operations only led to an increase in under-reporting as the tempo of operations weakened the ability to maintain discipline and enthusiasm to investigate and record infringements. As fatigue grew and unit cohesion reduced, unrecorded ill-discipline increased exponentially, culminating in chaotic scenes in and around Channel ports.

The official history of discipline 1939–45 defined discipline as the ‘maintenance of proper subordination in the Army’ through artificially created attributes of ‘self-control, orderliness, obedience and capacity for cooperation’.1 It also argued good discipline was ‘a primary and indispensable factor’ to British success during 1939–45.2 Subsequently, historians have shown how methods of creating and maintaining good discipline, as well as incidences of ill-discipline, were issues of concern for British commanders throughout the war. David French has demonstrated army commanders felt sufficiently concerned about ill-discipline in spring 1940 (France), April 1942 (North Africa) and February 1944 (Italy), that they campaigned for the reintroduction of the death penalty as a deterrent.3 Jonathan Fennell has highlighted General Auchinleck’s alarm when arguing disciplinary measures clearly did not restrain soldiers from deserting in large numbers, since 88 per cent of Eighth Army casualties during summer 1942 were designated missing or surrender personnel.4 Christine Bielecki has argued concerns about ill-discipline continued to overshadow the Army during the Italian campaign as war-weariness led to an unstoppable escalation in desertion despite increasingly punitive measures.5 These three studies make clear that discipline was a constant concern for the Army throughout the war; as the war progressed these concerns inspired an increasingly thorough and scientific approach to discipline.

Army personnel were likely to become destructive elements, both individually and within their primary group (immediate associates), when unhappy in their posting or incapable of the tasks being asked of them. As the Army expanded and discipline became less predictable, Adjutant General Ronald Adam established, in June 1941, the Directorate of Selection of Personnel to assign jobs dependent

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